ADMINISTRATIVE “SELF-REGULATION” AND THE RULE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CHINA
Shen Kui*
From a historical perspective, the formation and evolution of
administrative law in many countries and regions have relied upon
the important role and contribution of the judiciary. China is no
exception in this respect. Over the past roughly thirty years, since
the promulgation of the Administrative Litigation Law in 1989,
Chinese courts have worked hard to secure the compliance of
administrative actions with laws and regulations, and have acted as
disguised lawmakers in fashioning new norms in regulating
administrative agencies.
The development of administrative law in China has also been
propelled by legislation. The National People’s Congress (NPC)
and its Standing Committee have promulgated several laws
regulating particular types of administrative action, such as
administrative punishment, administrative licensing, and
administrative compulsion, among others. Moreover, the NPC has
passed many laws regulating specific areas of public administration,
including but not limited to environmental protection, land
administration, taxation, insurance, banking, and securities. In
addition to making laws to regulate public administration, the
legislature also monitors agencies’ statutory compliance through its
“law enforcement inspection” power.1
* Professor, Peking University School of Law. I am very grateful to
Neysun Mahboubi for his kind and helpful comments and edits on an earlier draft.
I also am indebted to the comments from the participants of the 9th
Administrative Law Discussion Forum at the Institutum Iurisprudentiae,
Academia Sinica in Taipei on June 10-11, 2014, as well as the participants of the
roundtable discussion centered on this special issue of the University of
Pennsylvania Asia Law Review held at Peking University Law School in Beijing
on June 21, 2014.
1
See Lin Yan & Jacques deLisle, The NPC Standing Committee’s Law
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Presently, in China, however, the legislature and judiciary are
inherently limited as external checking mechanisms. It is
insufficient to rely on them alone to fully advance Chinese
administrative law. Meanwhile, especially since the late 1990’s,
“self-regulation” or internal control within Chinese administration
itself has come to play an important role which ought to be
highlighted.2 This paper will delineate such “administrative selfregulation” in China through the examples of rulemaking
procedures, “filing and check” of normative documents, and criteria
for the exercise of administrative discretion.3
Why would the Chinese administration be incentivized to
pursue “self-regulation,” given its dominant position in the political
structure? This paper will argue that administrative self-regulation
is driven by a variety of dynamics that include pressures for
democratic legitimacy, as well as the demands of the bureaucratic
structure.
However, the drivers for administrative self-regulation are
limited in terms of their strength and effectiveness. Therefore,
while self-regulation is an important phenomenon and cannot be
ignored, the rule of administrative law in China cannot ultimately
depend upon it. Without future political and judicial reforms
enhancing the positions of the legislature and the judiciary in the
public power structure, it is doubtful that administrative selfregulation can avoid administrative tyranny and truly ensure that
administration is subordinate to the rule of law.

I. EXTERNAL REGULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
AND ITS LIMITS
Enforcement Inspection Power: Brief History, Process and Main Functions, U.
PA. ASIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
2
Id.
3
The term “administrative self-regulation” (xingzheng zizhi or xingzheng
ziwo guizhi) in this paper refers to hierarchical supervision from within the
administrative regime, as contrasted with “external” supervision by the legislature
or judiciary.
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A. The Role of the Legislature
Since judicial review of administrative action was fully
established in China by the promulgation of the Administrative
Litigation Law in 1989,4 there have been a number of significant
developments in the area of administrative law, including legislative
enactment of laws on state compensation, administrative
reconsideration, and administrative supervision,5 as well as laws on
administrative penalties, administrative licensing, compulsory
enforcement, and rulemaking.6 Many basic laws in specific areas of
4

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (中华人民共和
国行政诉讼法) [Administrative Litigation Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l
People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) (China). Actually, it was the
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) (中华人民共和国民
事诉讼法(试行)) [Civil Procedure Law (interim)] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 8, 1982, expired in 1991) that first introduced
judicial review of administrative action in civil procedure. However, on the basis
of that law alone, the justifiability of administrative action was not generally
confirmed, but rather depended upon specific authorizations in particular statutes.
5
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (中华人民共和国
行政复议法) [Law on Administrative Reconsideration] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999,
amended Aug. 27, 2009); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Jiancha Fa
(中华人民共和国行政监察法)
[Law on Administrative
Supervision]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 9, 1997,
effective May 9, 1997, amended June 25, 2010); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Guojia Peichang Fa (中华人民共和国国家赔偿法) [State Compensation Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 12, 1994,
effective Jan. 1, 1995, amended Apr. 29, 2010 & Oct. 26, 2012).
6
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Qiangzhi Fa (中华人民共和
国行政强制法) [Law on Compulsory Enforcement] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 30, 2011, effective Jan. 1, 2012);
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Xuke Fa (中华人民共和囯行政许可
法) [Law on Administrative Licensing] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004); Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华人民共和国立法法) [Law on Legislation]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000,
amended Mar. 15, 2015; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa (中
华人民共和国行政处罚法) [Law on Administrative Penalties] (promulgated by
the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996, amended Aug. 27,
2009).
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public administration, including environmental protection, land
administration, tax collection, insurance, banking, and securities
have also been promulgated.7 All of these law-makings have been
produced by the NPC and its Standing Committee, and have
established a general framework for regulating administrative
agencies. Through these means, public administration has been
constituted, limited, proceduralized, and made accountable.
Of course, most of this legislation (with the notable exception
of the Administrative Litigation Law)8 was initially drafted by
government departments or the Legislative Affairs Office of the
State Council.9 Inevitably, many administrative priorities were
7

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yinhangye Jiandu Guanli Fa (中华人民
共和国银行业监督管理法) [Banking Supervision Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2004,
amended Oct. 31, 2006); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa (中华人
民共和国证券法) [Securities Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective Jul. 1, 1999, amended Aug. 28, 2004,
Oct. 27, 2005, Jun. 29, 2013, and Aug. 31, 2014); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Baoxian Fa (中华人民共和国保险法) [Insurance Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jun. 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995,
amended Dec. 28, 2002, Feb. 28, 2009, and Aug. 31, 2014); Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Shuishou Zhengshou Guanli Fa (中华人民共和国税收征收管理法)
[Tax Collection Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Sep. 4, 1992, effective Jan. 1, 1993, amended Feb. 28, 1995, Apr. 28, 2001, Jun.
29, 2013, and Apr. 24, 2015); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa
(中华人民共和国环境保护法) [Environmental Protection Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26,
1989, amended Apr. 24, 2014); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanli Fa (中
华人民共和国土地管理法) [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jun. 25, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987,
amended Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998, and Aug. 28, 2004).
8
The Administrative Litigation Law was initially drafted by the
“Administrative Law Research Group,” comprised mostly of legal scholars,
which was delegated this task by the NPC Standing Committee’s Legal Affairs
Working Commission. Neysun A. Mahboubi, Participation and Accountability in
Chinese Administrative Procedure (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
9
Legislative affairs offices, at each level of government at or above the
county level, are charged with overall planning and coordination of rulemaking by
the government, ex ante review of draft rules, “filing and check” as well as post
hoc review of promulgated rules, providing legal advice for major decision-
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planted therein.10 Even so, these laws were examined by and issued
in the name of the national legislature, and reflect legislative will,
external to the administrative regime, as to the regulation of public
administration. Over time, it has become increasingly common for
agencies to solicit NPC opinions while preparing initial legislative
drafts11—or even for the NPC Standing Committee’s Legal Affairs
Working Commission or the NPC Special Committees themselves
to take over initial drafting.12 Further, there have been a growing
making (zhongda juece) by the government, undertaking administrative
reconsideration procedures, and handling administrative litigation cases, among
other responsibilities.
10
In China, this phenomenon is usually referenced as “departmentalist
legislation” (bumen lifa). Infra note 18.
11
As a scholar who is frequently called upon in this respect, I have
personally witnessed the trend, in which it is increasingly common for agencies
charged with preparing legislative drafts to invite experts from both the national
and local people’s congresses, as well as experts from academia and practice, to
participate in roundtable discussions on the contents of their drafts. One of the
reasons for this may be that such ex ante dialogues are presumed to help the
agency’s positions or priorities in the later legislative process.
12
It is rare, in China, for the NPC’s subordinate institutions to make the
initial draft of legislation. However, there are a few examples. See, e.g.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民
共和国劳动争议调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec., 29, 2007,
effective May 1, 2008) was drafted by the NPC Standing Committee’s Legal
Affairs Working Commission; Wang Wenzhen & Zhang Shicheng (王文珍&张世
诚), Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa de Xintupo (《劳动争议调解仲裁
法》的新突破) [New Breakthrough of the Labor Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration Law], 56 ZHONGGUO LAODONG [CHINA LAB.] 6, 6–10 (2008); the
amendment of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohufa (中华人民共和
国环境保护法) [Environmental Protection Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989, amended
Apr. 24, 2014) was launched by Quanguo Renda Huanjing yu Ziyuan Baohu
Weiyuanhui (全国人民代表大会环境与资源保护委员会) [NPC Environmental
and Resources Protection Committee]; Ou Changmei (欧昌梅), Huanbaofa Ying
Xieqingchu Zhengfu Zeren (环保法应写清楚政府责任) [Environmental
Protection Law Should Stipulate Clearly the Government Responsibility],
DONGFANG ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL MORNING POST] (Mar. 19, 2013),
http://money.163.com/13/0319/10/8QAQRO6G00253B0H.html
[https://perma.cc/M3XX-329H] (showing examples of NPC Standing
Committee’s Legal Affairs Working Commission or the NPC Special Committees
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number of instances where the NPC has declined to approve
proposed bills submitted by the State Council.
Despite this, the role of the NPC as a proponent for the rule of
law in China is still quite limited. This is not only because of
problems common to legislatures in many countries, but also
because of certain deficiencies specific to China. Many legislatures
grant administrative agencies quasi-legislative power, almost like a
blank check with doctrines of non-delegation existing in name
only.13 Administrative discretion is further compelled by out-ofdate statutes, insofar as legislatures cannot foresee everything or
make laws in time to deal with every new change. Moreover, the
Chinese legislature has its own particular shortcomings. First, the
relationship between NPC deputies and their constituents is so weak
that it is difficult for the legislative process to adequately reflect
public concerns about regulating administration.14 Second, many
NPC deputies and Standing Committee members are not legal
professionals, and thus their capacity to propose and scrutinize bills
is quite limited.15 Third, national legislative sessions are too short,
taking over initial drafting).
13
See WILLIAM WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 388 (6th ed. 1988)
(observing the connection between discretionary powers and the rule of law);
Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1676–77 (1975) (discussing the loose legislative control of
administrative discretion).
14
Jiang Jinsong (蒋劲松), Quanguo Renda Changweihui de
Daibiaoxing Tantao (全国人大常委会的代表性探讨) [Discussion On the
Representative Nature of the NPC Standing Committee], 26 ZHENGFA LUNTAN
[TRIB. OF POL. SCI. AND L.] 19, 19–31 (2004); Zou Pingxue (邹平学), Renmin
Daibiao Dahui De Guimo Kunjing yu Daibiaoxing de Luoji Beilun (人民代表大
会的规模困境与代表性的逻辑悖论)
[The
Scale
Predicament
and
Representativeness Paradox of the People’s Congress], 18 RENDA YANJIU
[PEOPLE’S CONG. RES.] 11, 11–15 (2009); Huang Xuexian & Zhu Zhongyi (黄学
贤&朱中一), Wanshan Renda Daibiao Daibiaoxing de Tantao (完善人大代表代
表性的探讨) [On the Improvement of the Representativeness of People’s
Congress Deputies], 14 RENDA YANJIU [PEOPLE’S CONG. RES.] 5, 5–9 (2005).
15
Zhang Ruicun (张瑞存), Woguo Renda Daibiao Zhuanzhihua de
Xianshi Zhang’ai Jiqi Weilai Fazhan (我国人大代表专职化的现实障碍及其未
来发展) [The Practical Obstacles and Future Development of the
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as there is insufficient time for proper deliberation on proposed
bills.16 Finally, as noted above, many bills are initially drafted by
administrative agencies, and even with the new trend noted above,17
departmentalism in the legislative process remains practically
unavoidable.18
Thus, while the NPC and its Standing Committee have made
great progress by setting up the basic framework of Chinese
administrative law over the past two and a half decades, it is
difficult for the national legislature to promptly meet rising public
demands for better laws regulating the administration. For example,
it took more than twenty-five years for the NPC to revise the
Administrative Litigation Law (“ALL”) in November 2014,
notwithstanding the many insufficiencies that became readily
apparent and ever more acute as great economic and social changes
took place. Legislative promulgation of a general Administrative
Procedure Law (“APL”), long discussed by Chinese administrative
law scholars, was listed in 2013 in the legislative plan of the Tenth
Professionalization of People’s Congress Deputies], 19 LILUN YU GAIGE [THEORY
AND REFORM] 64, 64–66 (2004); Liu Shuhua & Guoying (刘淑华&郭颖), Lun
Renda Daibiao Zhuanzhihua yu Woguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu de
Wanshan
(论人大代表专职化与我国人民代表大会制度的完善)
[On
Specialization of People’s Congress Deputies and Improvement of the People’s
Congress System], 29 FAXUE ZAZHI [L. SCI. MAG.] 114, 114–16 (2008); Xie
Xiangwei (谢祥为), Luelun Woguo Renda Daibiao de Zhuanzhihua (略论我国人
大代表的专职化) [On the Professionalization of People’s Congress Deputies], 12
RENDA YANJIU [PEOPLE’S CONG. RES.] 4, 4–7 (2003).
16
The NPC holds its plenary meeting (lasting twelve days) once a year.
The NPC Standing Committee meets for three to five days every two months.
17
See supra notes 11, 12, and accompanying text (detailing the trend).
18
Mao Shoulong (毛寿龙), Huajie Bumen Lifa Wenti de Zhidu Jiegou
(化解部门立法问题的制度结构) [Dissolving the Institutional Structure
Underlying Departmental Legislation], 20 LILUN SHIYE [THEORETICAL
HORIZONS] 40, 40–47 (2012); Xu Yanhua & Han Liqiang (徐燕华&韩立强),
Bumen Liyi: Bumen Lifa Mobuqu de Henji (部门利益——部门立法抹不去的痕
迹) [Departmental Interests: Non-Erasable Trace of Departmental Legislation],
15 SHANXI JINGGUAN GAODENG ZHUANKE XUEXIAO XUEBAO [J. OF SHANXI
POLICE ACAD.] 29, 29-32 (2007); Tang Yaoguo & Zhu Yingying (汤耀国&朱莹
莹), Chaoyue Bumen Lifa (超越部门立法) [Beyond Departmentalism In the
Legislation], 27 LIAOWANG [OUTLOOK] 46, 46–47 (2007).
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NPC Standing Committee as “a law which should be researched and
drafted and, when ripe, submitted for discussion.”19 Yet in 2008 it
was withdrawn from the legislative plan of the Eleventh NPC
Standing Committee.20 In 2013, the APL was listed in the
legislative plan of the Twelfth NPC Standing Committee, but as a
third-category law (i.e., conditions not ripe for legislative review
and further researched required) as opposed to a first-category law
(i.e., conditions ripe for submission and discussion in the term) or a
second-category law (i.e., subject to drafting for submission when
conditions ripen).21 The arduous process of lawmaking does not
necessarily mean that the NPC is not competent to regulate
administration agencies, but it does reflect the pre-dominance of the
administrative agencies in the ruling of China.
B. Judicial Review
In the current administrative law framework, and in particular
under the ALL, courts are limited to reviewing “administrative
actions.”22 The standard of judicial review is legality in its
narrowest sense––although in a few cases, courts do step a little

19

Shijie Quanguo Renda Changweihui Lifa Guihua (十届全国人大常
委会立法规划) [Legislative Plan of the Tenth NPC Standing Committee],
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2003/12/id/96741.shtml
[https://perma.cc/EZ4Z-6QAG] (last visited Mar. 16, 2017).
20
Shi’yijie Quanguo Renda Changweihui Lifa Guihua (十一届全国人
大常委会立法规划) [Legislative Plan of the Eleventh NPC Standing
Committee],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/200810/29/content_1455985.htm [https://perma.cc/J38H-5Y6M] (last visited Mar. 16,
2017).
21
Shi’erjie Quanguo Renda Changweihui Lifa Guihua (十二届全国人
大常委会立法规划) [Legislative Plan of the Twelve NPC Standing Committee],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zgrdzz/2013-12/12/content_1816288.htm
[https://perma.cc/3W53-M93E] (last visited Mar. 16, 2017).
22
Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 4, art. 2. According to the
newly revised ALL, “administrative action” includes administrative decision or
measure without general binding effects, as well as administrative agreements
(xingzheng xieyi).
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further to examine the rationality of administrative actions.23 Like
courts in most other countries, Chinese courts are not inflexible
automatons. In some administrative litigation cases, reviewing
courts also have played the role of lawmakers, albeit in a somewhat
disguised and very careful way.
For example, even though there is no “due process clause” in
the PRC Constitution, Chinese courts have, in some cases, required
administrative agencies to follow fundamental principles of due
process even when they are not clearly provided in relevant laws
and regulations. In one case, the appellate court stated:
In the process of house demolition, given the principle
of due process, in order to protect the legal interest of
the house owner and/or lessee, the assessment report of
the house to be demolished shall be served to the house
owner and/or lessee, for them to know in time the
assessment result, bring out their objections, if any, and
apply for reassessment without delay.24
In another case, the reviewing court ruled as follows:
Even though the Law on Administrative Licensing does
not specifically stipulate the procedure for annulling an
administrative license, under Articles 5 and 7, the
establishment and implementation of an administrative
license shall abide by the principles of publicity,
fairness and impartiality, and citizens, legal persons and
other organizations are entitled to make statements and
defend themselves while facing an agency
See Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 4, art. 70 (providing
for the judicial review standards of “abuse of power” and “obvious
inappropriateness” which are the basis for rationality review).
24
See Lutingzuo Su Shanghaishi Zhabeiqu Fangwutudi Guanliju
Fangwuchaiqian Xingzhengcaijue Jiufenan (陆廷佐诉上海市闸北区房屋土地管
理局房屋拆迁行政裁决纠纷案) [Lu Tingzuo v. Housing and Land
Administration of Zhabei District of Shanghai], 2007 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ .
(2nd
Shanghai
Interm.
People’s
Ct.
Feb.
27,
2006),
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=case&id=633
[https://perma.cc/3LEH-8PSN].
23
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implementing an administrative license.
These
provisions are the principles that shall be followed in
the process of administrative licensing. The defendant
here shall abide by the above mentioned provisions.
However, the defendant did neither notify the plaintiff
nor give it the chance of statements and defense, as
violated the principle of publicity stipulated by the Law
on Administrative Licensing and the defendant’s right
of statements and defense. Besides, the notification of
annulment without giving reasons is inconsistent with
the basic requirements of administrative procedure.25
Nevertheless, Chinese courts usually tend to rely on positive
laws and regulations as the sole measuring stick for determining the
legality of administrative action.26 Furthermore, the status of courts
in the overall state power structure is relatively weak, mostly due to
the lack of full independence. Altogether, it is very difficult for
courts to be a major producer of administrative law or act as the
major external check on public administration.27 This is why
25

See Beijing Lilaodie Yutou Huoguo Youxiangongsi Fangzhuang
Fengongsi Bufu Beijingshi Fengtaiqu Huanjingbaohuju Chexiao Huanbao
Xingzheng Xukean (北京李老爹鱼头火锅有限公司方庄分公司不服北京市丰
台区环境保护局撤销环保行政许可案) [Fangzhuang Branch of Beijing Lilaodie
Fish Hot Pot Co. Ltd. v. Bureau of Environment Protection of Fengtai District of
Beijing], (Beijing Fengtai Dist. People’s Ct. June 16, 2005),
http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/pfnl_a25051f3312b07f3f0f364c54a1ada4b6b0c858c2
62adcff.html?keywords=%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E6%9D%8E%E8%80%
81%E7%88%B9%E9%B1%BC%E5%A4%B4&match=Exact
[https://perma.cc/HF3H-9ZW5].
26
See, e.g., Ji Weidong (季卫东), Zhongguo Sifa de Siwei Fangshi jiqi
Wenhua Tezheng (中国司法的思维方式及其文化特征) [The Thinking Style of
the Chinese Judiciary and its Cultural Features], 3 FAL Ü FANGFA YU FALÜ SIWEI
[LEGAL METHOD AND LEGAL THINKING] 68, 85 (2005) (“Generally, in modern
China, the starting points for judicial thinking are the people’s sovereignty and the
judiciary being subject to the legislature . . . The metaphor of a vending machine
could also be applied.”).
27
WANG QINGHUA (汪庆华), ZHENGZHIZHONG DE SIFA: ZHONGGUO
XINGZHENG SUSONG DE FALÜ SHEHUIXUE KAOCHA (政治中的司法：中国行政
诉讼的法律社会学考察) [THE JUDICIARY IN THE POLITICS: ADMINISTRATIVE
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academics and the public hope for the improvement of judicial
review of agency action rests not on the prospect of courts
becoming more active and dynamic, but rather on the greater
judicial authority that might derive from the implementation of the
new revision of the ALL and from generally progressive judicial
reform.
II. Administrative Self-Regulation
Given the abovementioned limitations on the Chinese
legislature and judiciary, as potential checks on administrative
action, the notion of the administration itself developing Chinese
administrative law should not be discounted. Indeed, administrative
authorities have taken on this role ever since the policy of reform
and opening-up was adopted in the late 1970s. Most recently, the
landmark event symbolizing such “administrative self-regulation”
was the issuance of the State Council’s Decision on Promoting
Administration According to Law in 1999 (“1999 Decision”),28 that
was rooted in new language added to the Constitution the same year
that identified the PRC as “a socialist country ruled by law.”29
Since the 1999 Decision, the State Council has consecutively
promulgated four related policy documents: the Outline on
Comprehensively Promoting Administration According to Law in
2004 (the “2004 Outline”),30 the State Council’s Decision on
LITIGATION IN CHINA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL SOCIOLOGY] (2011).
28
Guowuyuan Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin Yifa Xingzheng De Jueding (国
务院关于全面推进依法行政的决定) [State Council’s Decision on Promoting
Administration According to Law] (promulgated by the St. Council Nov. 8, 1999,
effective Nov. 8, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Decision].
29
XIANFA art. 5 (1999). Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (1999
Xiuzheng) (中华人民共和国宪法(1999修正)) [Constitution of the People's
Republic of China (1999 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong.,
effective Mar., 15, 1999, amended Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter XIANFA], art. 5,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=18536&lib=law&SearchKeyword
=&SearchCKeyword=%d6%d0%bb%aa%c8%cb%c3%f1%b9%b2%ba%cd%b9
%fa%cf%dc%b7%a8 [https://perma.cc/9Q6V-338R].
30
Quanmian Tuijin Yifa Xingzheng Shishi Gangyao (全面推进依法行政

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

[2018]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

83

Strengthening Administration According to Law at Municipal and
County-Level Governments in 2008 (the “2008 Decision”),31 the
State Council’s Opinions on Strengthening the Building of Rule of
Law Government in 2010 (the “2010 Opinions”),32 and the
Implementing Outline for Establishing Rule of Law Government
(2015-2020) in 2015 jointly by CCCPC and the State Council.33
Under Chinese law, these are not formal administrative regulations
(xingzheng fagui) with legally binding effects.34 However, they are
issued by the highest authority of the administrative system, and
hence exercise very significant influence on State Council
departments as well as local governments. Following these policy
documents, governments at or above the county level have worked
to develop a range of internal checks on administrative behavior.
实施纲要) [Outline on Comprehensively Promoting Administration According to
Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, Mar. 22, 2004, effective Mar. 22, 2004)
[hereinafter 2004 Outline].
31
Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Shixian Zhengfu Yifa Xingzheng De
Jueding (国务院关于加强市县政府依法行政的决定) [ State Council’s Decision
on Strengthening Administration According to Law at Municipal and CountyLevel Governments] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 12, 2008, effective
May 12, 2008), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-06/18/content_1020629.htm
[https://perma.cc/P5AX-U8NB] [hereinafter 2008 Decision].
32
Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe De Yijian (国务
院关于加强法治政府建设的意见) [State Council’s Opinions on Strengthening
the Building of Rule of Law Government] (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct.
10,
2010, effective Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/201011/08/content_1740765.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5P9-7MQB] [hereinafter 2010
Opinions]. It was repealed by Guowuyuan Guanyu Xuanbu Shixiao Yipi
Guowuyuan Wenjian de Jueding (国务院关于宣布失效一批国务院文件的决定)
[Decision of the State Council on Repealing a Group of Documents of the St.
Council,
June
25,
2016,
effective
June
25,
2016]
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=288188
[https://perma.cc/NP7B-6XG3].
33
Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2015-2020) (法治政府建设
实施纲要) [Implementing Outline for Establishing Rule of Law Government
(2015-2020), (promulgated by CCCPC and the St. Council, Dec. 23, 2015,
effective Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/201512/28/content_5028323.htm [https://perma.cc/L4V5-NGPZ].
34
“Xingzheng fagui” refers to regulations formally enacted by the State
Council.
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Some key examples, further described below, include ex ante
rulemaking procedures, post hoc review of promulgated rules, and
the elaboration of criteria limiting the exercise of administrative
discretion.
A. Rulemaking Procedures and Examination of Legality
The

Law

on

Legislation

incorporates

administrative

regulations (xingzheng fagui) (行政法规) and rules (guizhang) (规
章)35 into the category of law (fa) (法), and provides principles and
frameworks concerning procedures for their formulation. Further
and more detailed procedural norms are stipulated in the State
Council’s Ordinance on Procedures for the Formulation of
Administrative Regulations36 and its Ordinance on Procedures for
the Formulation of Rules.37
In addition to administrative
regulations and rules, there are many so called “normative
documents” (guifanxing wenjian) (规范性文件) produced by
governments at various levels, from the central down to the most
local. It is crucial to pay more attention to and better regulate these
guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件) because many of them directly
impact individual rights and duties.
Absent a uniform
administrative procedure law, it appears the administrative regime is

35

“Guizhang” (规章) refers to the formal legislative rules made by the
departments of the State Council, the provincial governments, the governments of
the municipalities directly under the central government, or the governments of
some larger cities.
36
Xingzheng Fagui Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli (行政法规制定程序条例)
[Ordinance for Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Rules]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 16, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002, amended
Dec. 22, 2017, effective May 1, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201801/16/content_5257039.htm [https://perma.cc/QL2E-U74L].
37
Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli (规章制定程序条例) [Ordinance
on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules] (promulgated by the St. Council,
Nov. 16, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002, amended Dec. 22, 2017, effective May 1,
2018),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-01/16/content_5257080.htm
[https://perma.cc/BE49-BR3Q].
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attempting to “self-regulate” by delineating the procedures for
formulation of such “normative documents.” The 2004 Outline
stipulates several requirements, including:
1) The formulating agency shall hear wide-ranging public
opinions in various ways while drafting guifanxing
wenjian (规范性文件). The agency shall solicit opinions
from society on final drafts of great significance, through
multiple and alternative procedures such as formal
hearing, discussion meeting, or publication.
2) The contents of the guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件)
shall be concrete, clear, and flexible, as well as capable of
resolving problems in practice.
3) The guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件), after being
finalized, is to be published in the relevant government’s
gazette, and on its official website, as well as in general
circulation newspapers or journals.
4) The agency shall attempt to set up and develop a
regularized review system, aimed at “cleaning up”
(qingli) (清理) conflicting or out-of-date guifanxing
wenjian (规范性文件).
5) The formulating agency and the enforcing agency are
to regularly evaluate the enforcement of guifanxing
wenjian (规范性文件), with the enforcing agency
reporting its ongoing evaluation to the formulating
agency.38
Building on the 2004 Outline, the 2010 Opinions add these
further requirements:
1) No guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件) is permitted to
serve as the basis for an administrative license,
administrative punishment or administrative compulsory

38

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/5
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measure, or to impose new duties on a citizen, legal
person or other organization.
2) Guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件) which directly
influence the rights and duties of a citizen, legal person or
other organization must be publicized for public
comment, reviewed for lawfulness by the relevant
legislative affairs office, and discussed by the executive
conference of the local government.
3) Local governments are to work towards unifying the
registration, serial numbers, and publication of their (or
their departments’) guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件).39
The prescriptions in the 2004 Outline and the 2010 Opinions
do not have legally binding effects under orthodox administrative
law doctrines, but they do have significant practical influence on
subordinate administrative agencies.
There are at least six
40
departments of the State Council, and thirty-eight provincial and
39

2010 Opinions, supra note 32, art. 9.
See, e.g., Guojia Zongjiao Shiwuju Guizhang He Guifanxing Wenjian
Zhiding Chengxu Guiding (国家宗教事务局规章和规范性文件制定程序规定)
[Provisions of the State Administration for Religious Affairs on Procedures for the
Formulation of Regulations and Normative Documents] (promulgated by the St.
Admin. Religious Affairs, Aug. 11, 2010, effective Aug. 11, 2010),
http://sara.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfg/bmgz/5089.htm; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Haishiju Guifanxing Wenjian Zhiding Chengxu Guiding (中华人民共和国海事
局规范性文件制定程序规定) [Provisions of the Maritime Safety Administration
on Procedures for the Formulation of Maritime Normative Documents]
(promulgated by the Mar. Safety Admin., May 4, 2010, effective July 1, 2010);
Guojia Zhiliang Jiandu Jianyan Jianyi Zongju Guifanxing Wenjian Guanli Banfa
(国家质量监督检验检疫总局规范性文件管理办法) [Administrative Measures
of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine
for Normative Documents] (promulgated by the Gen. Admin. Quality
Supervision, Inspection, & Quarantine, March 15, 2010, effective May 1, 2010);
Shuishou Guifanxing Wenjian Zhiding Guanli Banfa (税收规范性文件制定管理
办法) [Administrative Measures for the Formulation of Tax Normative
Documents] (promulgated by the St. Admin. Taxation, Feb. 1, 2010, effective Jul.
1,
2010),
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810765/n812161/n812579/c1086146/conte
nt.html [https://perma.cc/5RAJ-865G]; Zhongguo Minyong Hangkong Zongju
40
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municipal governments that have issued follow-up regulations
concerning the procedures for formulating guifanxing wenjian (规
范性文件).41 In addition, there have been at least six ministerial or
local government rules issued concerning the “lawfulness review”
of guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件).42

Of course, the actual

Zhineng Bumen Guifanxing Wenjian Zhiding Chengxu Guiding (中国民用航空
总局职能部门规范性文件制定程序规定) [Procedural Provisions on the
Formulation of Normative Documents by the Functional Departments under the
General Administration of Civil Aviation of China] (promulgated by the Gen.
Admin. Civ. Aviation, Aug. 31, 2007, effective Oct. 10, 2007),
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/200212/20021200059849.shtml;
Duiwai
Maoyi Jingji Hezuobu Falü, Xingzheng Fagui Qicao Ji Guizhang, Guifanxing
Wenjian Zhiding Banfa (对外贸易经济合作部法律，行政法规起草及规章，规
章规范性文件制定办法) [Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation for the Drafting of Laws and Administrative Regulations
and the Formulation of Ministerial Rules and Normative Documents]
(promulgated by the Ministry Foreign Trade & Econ. Cooperation, Aug. 1, 2002,
effective
Sept.
1,
2002),
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=5731&CGid=
[https://perma.cc/RG7J-5FF7] (listing examples of follow-up regulations
concerning the procedures for formulating guifanxing wenjian issued by six
departments of the State Council).
41
Infra note 41. The referenced provinces and municipalities are
Shenzhen, Tianjin, Zhengzhou, Anhui, Shanxi, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Qingdao,
Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Sichuan, Hainan, Ningxia, Guangxi, Shantou, Urumqi,
Shijiazhuang, Nanchang, Shaanxi, Wuhan, Suzhou, Jinan, Xi’an, Luoyang,
Gansu, Heilongjiang, Handan, Jiangsu, Xining, Hunan, Liaoning, Chengdu,
Guiyang, Zhuhai, Zhejiang, Hebei, and Xiamen.
42
See, e.g., Changshashi Guifanxing Wenjian Hefaxing Shencha
Shenqing Banli Gongzuo Guiding (长沙市规范性文件合法性审查申请办理工
作) [Measures of Changsha for the Application for and Handling of Lawfulness
Review of Normative Documents] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Changsha Municipality, Dec. 16, 2010, effective Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.changsha.gov.cn/xxgk/gfxwj/wjcl/201601/t20160111_872858.html
[https://perma.cc/FZ2L-ZF79]; Huizhoushi Zhengfu Bumen Guifanxing Wenjian
Hefaxing Shencha Zhidu (惠州市政府部门规范性文件合法性审查制度)
[Lawfulness Review System for Normative Documents by the Functional
Departments of Huizhou Municipality Government] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Huizhou Municipality, Feb. 23, 2010, effective Feb. 23, 2010),
http://xxgk.huizhou.gov.cn/0000/0201/201608/ee0975abb57f4b898b42c211e7710
127.shtml [https://perma.cc/J9QG-B4U4]; Guotu Ziyuan Guanli Guifanxing
Wenjian Hefaxing Shencha Banfa (国土资源管理规范性文件合法性审查办法)
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implementation of these rules is still unclear and requires more
empirical study. Promulgation itself does not necessarily suggest
that there have been great advances in the regulation of guifanxing
wenjian (规范性文件) in practice. However, since these rules are
well-publicized, it is certainly within legitimate public expectation
that administrative agencies shall follow these procedural
requirements when formulating guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件).
B. Filing and Check
The processes of NPC review for constitutionality and legality
established by the Law on Legislation apply inter alia to
administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui) (行政法规) and local
regulations (difangxing fagui) (地方性法规).43

Any citizen or

[Measures for Lawfulness Review of Normative Documents on Land and
Resources Administration] (promulgated by the Ministry Land & Res., Nov. 27,
2006,
effective
Jan.
1,
2007),
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/flfg/gtzybl/200612/t20061227_648779.htm
[https://perma.cc/P8YP-WDM7];
Shengzhengfu Bumen Guifanxing Wenjian Hefaxing Shencha Zanxing Guiding
(省政府部门规范性文件合法性审查暂行规定)
[Interim
Provisions
on
Lawfulness Review of Normative Documents by the Functional Departments of
Hebei Provincial Government] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Hebei
Provincial Gov’t, Nov. 4, 2006, effective Dec. 1, 2006); Zhejiangsheng Guotu
Ziyuan Guanli Guifanxing Wenjian Hefaxing Shencha Banfa (浙江省国土资源管
理规范性文件合法性审查办法) [Measures for Lawfulness Review of the
Normative Documents on Land and Resources Administration of Zhejiang
Province] (promulgated by Zhejiang Admin. Land & Res., Sep. 27, 2006,
effective
Sep.
27,
2006),
www.zjlic.com/admin/eWeb/uploadfile/20090730084200409.doc;
Hebeisheng
Laodong He Shehui Baozhangting Guifanxing Wenjian Hefaxing Shencha He
Bei’an Banfa (Zanxing) (河北省劳动和社会保障厅规范性文件合法性审查和
备案办法)（暂行）[Interim Measures for Lawfulness Review and Filing of
Normative Documents by the Labor and Social Security Department of Hebei
Province] (promulgated by Heibei Dep’t Lob. & Soc. Sec., Aug. 3, 2005, effective
Aug. 3, 2005) (listing six examples of ministerial or local government rules issued
concerning the “lawfulness review” of guifanxing wenjian).
43
“Difangxing fagui” (地方性法规) refers to the local statutes made by
provincial and municipal people’s congresses and their standing committees.
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organization has the right to submit a proposal or request for such
review to the NPC Standing Committee.44 In the absence of
Western-style separation of powers, in practice, this review
mechanism has developed into, this paper would call, a model of
“proposal + self-correction.”
The Sun Zhigang (孙志刚) case in 200345 and the Tang
Fuzhen (唐福珍) case in 200946 are the best illustrations of this
44
See Articles 99 and 100 of the Law on Legislation (stipulating
individual and other organizations have rights to submit written legal review
suggestions).
45
On March 17, 2003, a 27 year old migrant worker named Sun
Zhigang (孙志刚) was sent to and detained in the housing & repatriation center in
Guangzhou only because he was found without an ID card by the local police. At
the station, he was beaten to death by other detainees. Media reports on this case
aroused widespread concern, as well as brought attention to the legality of the
State Council’s Measures for Housing and Repatriating City Vagrants and
Beggars (Chengshi Liulang Qitao Renyuan Shourong Qiansong Banfa) (城市流
浪乞讨人员收容遣送办法). See Sun Zhigang An Zhongjie Shourong Qiansong
Banfa? (孙志刚案终结收容遣送办法?)[The case of Sun Zhigang terminated the
Measures for Housing and Repatriating City Vagrants and Beggars?], SOUHU
WANG [SOHU.COM] (last visited Nov.4, 2017),
http://news.sohu.com/04/92/subject209299204.shtml [https://perma.cc/MAP5B4M5] (discussing the Sun Zhigang case and relevant impact it brings). In large
part due to the petitions for review of this regulation that were successively made
by three law Ph.D. students, followed by five more senior legal scholars (of which
the author was one), the State Council eventually annulled the aforementioned
regulation, and replaced the outdated housing & repatriation system with the
social relief system.
46
On November 13, 2009, a female entrepreneur named Tang Fuzhen
set herself on fire to protest the forced demolition of her factory buildings, which
were controversially determined to be illegal by the local government in Sichuan
province. Her death, after sixteen days of hospital treatment, provoked extensive
discussion in the media. See Chengdu Chaiqian Zifen Shijian Diaocha Tongbao
(成都“拆迁自焚”事件调查通报) [The Investigation report on Chengdu “Selfburning during House Demolition” case], SICHUAN XINWENWANG (Dec. 3,
2009),
http://society.people.com.cn/GB/41158/10506824.html
[https://perma.cc/HEZ2-EXPE] (introducing the case background and government
disposal of the case). On this basis, five law professors from Peking University
Law School (including the author) submitted to the NPC Standing Committee a
proposal for review of the constitutionality and legality of the State Council’s
Regulation on Urban Housing Demolition (Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli
Tiaoli) (城市房屋拆迁管理条例). After more than a year, the State Council
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model. In both cases, legal academics (including this author) filed a
request to the Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC Standing
Committee, hoping to activate the review procedure with respect to
two problematic regulations. However, the review procedure was
not formally initiated in either case by the NPC Standing
Committee. Instead, largely opaque communications between the
NPC and the State Council substituted for formal NPC review.47
Ultimately, it was the State Council itself, rather than the NPC, that
abolished the challenged measures: in the Sun Zhigang (孙志刚)
case, through its Measures on Custody and Repatriation of Vagrants
and Urban Beggars,48 and in the Tang Fuzhen (唐福珍) case,
through its Regulation on Urban Housing Demolition.49
This model of administrative self-correction extends broadly.
In 1987, the General Office of the State Council issued its Notice of
Archival Filing of Rules by Local Governments and Departments of
the State Council,50 which expressly required that ministerial rules
(bumen guizhang) (部门规章) and local government rules (difang
guizhang) (地方规章) be submitted to the State Council for archival

annulled this regulation and replaced it with a new, improved regulation on urban
takings and compensation thereafter.
47
Based on this author’s personal experience, these communications
between the two governmental organs were supplemented by several semi-formal
hearings in which the NPC and the State Council solicited public and expert
opinions.
48
Chengshi Liulang Qitao Renyuan Shourong Qiansong Banfa (城市流
浪乞讨人员收容遣送办法) [Measures on Custody and Repatriation of Vagrants
and Urban Beggars] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 12, 1982, effective
May 12, 1982, abolished Aug. 1, 2003).
49
Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli Tiaoli (城市房屋拆迁管理条例)
[Regulation on Urban Housing Demolition] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jun.
13, 2001, effective Nov. 1, 2001, abolished Jan. 21, 2011).
50
Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Difang Zhengfu He Guowuyuan
Gebumen Guizhang Bei’an Gongzuo de Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于地方政府
和国务院各部门规章备案工作的通知) [Notice of Archival Filing of Rules by
Local Governments and Departments of the State Council] (promulgated and
effective Mar. 7, 1987).
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filing. In 1990, the State Council promulgated an administrative
regulation for this system of “filing and check” (bei’an) (备案), the
Provisions on the Filing of Regulations and Government Rules.51
Under this regulation, the Legislative Bureau of the State Council52
undertook the task of “filing and checking” regulations (fagui) (法
规) and government rules (guizhang) (规章), examining the legality
and consistency of this administrative work-product. Some ten
years later, the passage of the Law on Legislation in 2001 also
propelled the State Council to issue a new Ordinance on the Filing
of Regulations and Government Rules,53 which abolished the earlier
regulation but retained the system of “filing and check.” The new
ordinance follows the Law on Legislation by also permitting
individuals to request such agency review.54
The 2004 Outline expands the “filing and check” mechanism
to all guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件) issued by administrative
agencies. 55 The 2010 Opinions further stipulates in detail:
A request for examination by a citizen, legal person or
other organization shall be handled strictly according to
relevant provisions.
Illegal government rules and
normative documents shall be reported without delay to
the authoritative organ for revocation, and the results of
the examination shall be publicized. Also, the filing
51

Fagui Guizhang Bei’an Guiding (法规规章备案规定) [Provisions on
the Filing of Regulations and Government Rules] (promulgated by the St.
Council, Feb. 18, 1990, effective Feb. 18, 1990, abolished Jan. 1, 2002).
52
The Legislative Bureau of the State Council was the predecessor of
the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council.
53
Fagui Guizhang Bei’an Tiaoli (法规规章备案条例) [Ordinance on
the Filing of Regulations and Government Rules] (promulgated by the St.
Council, Dec. 14, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002).
54
Article 9 of the Ordinance on the Filing of Regulations and
Government Rules.
55
See Article 29 of the 2004 Outline cited supra note 30 (stipulating that
should any individual or organization dispute the regulation or government rules,
the promulgating agency or executing agency should study and deal with it).
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oversight body shall publish a catalog of government
rules and normative documents that have been filed and
examined.56
On the impetus of the State Council, many of its
departments57 and at least thirty provincial and municipal
governments58 have since promulgated rules in regards to the “filing
and check” of guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件).
C. Criteria for Exercise of Administrative Discretion
In any modern administrative state, it is unavoidable that
legislators will delegate broad discretion to administrative agencies.
However, the exercise of such discretion by administrators can
result in substantial unfairness. In order to try to regularize the
exercise of administrative discretion, the 2008 Decision provides:
It is necessary to earnestly induce administrative
agencies to comb through provisions that stipulate
discretion concerning administrative punishments and
administrative licensing, and to detail their
administrative discretion in terms of the practical
development of the local economy and society, to
56

Article 10 of the 2010 Opinions cited supra note 32 (detailing the
requirements on government to deal with citizen or organizational request).
57
See, e.g., Shuilibu Guifanxing Wenjian Shencha Yu Bei’an Guanli
Banfa (水利部规范性文件审查与备案管理办法) [Administrative Measures of
the Ministry of Water Resources on the Examination and Filing of Normative
Documents] (promulgated and effective Aug. 3, 2005); Jiaotong Guifanxing
Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Zhidu (交通规范性文件备案审查制度) [System of the
Filing and Examination of Normative Documents of Communication
Administration] (promulgated Sep. 25, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996);
Nengyuanbu Guizhang, Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Banfa (能源部规章规范性文
件备案办法) [Measures of the Ministry of Energy on the Filing of Regulations
and Normative Documents] (promulgated and effective Oct. 5, 1990) (all listing
the “filing and check” rules on normative documents).
58
These are Zhengzhou, Liaoning, Jiangxi, Handan, Fushun, Guizhou,
Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Hubei, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan, Sichuan,
Shandong, Yinchuan, Hainan, Ningxia, Beijing, Nanchang, Anhui, Suzhou,
Henan, Luoyang, Lanzhou, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Guiyang, Shanghai, and
Fujian.
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quantify discretion that is capable of quantification, and
to publicize and implement such detailed and quantified
standards for the exercise of administrative discretion.59
This provision does not expressly reference the concept of
“criteria for administrative discretion” (xingzheng cailiang jizhun) (
行政裁量基准), but instead uses the concept of “standard for
administrative discretion” (xingzheng cailiang biaozhun) (行政裁量
标准). Yet, both academics and practitioners soon began to use the
terminology of “criteria,”60 and the 2010 Opinions hence adopted
that common usage:
They shall establish basic criteria for administrative
discretion, scientifically and reasonably detail and
quantify administrative discretion, improve the rules for
application, strictly standardize the exercise of
administrative discretion, and avoid arbitrary law
enforcement.61
Local governments have initially focused on discretionary
criteria for the exercise of administrative punishment, and these
form the main bulk of existing “criteria for administrative
59

2008 Decision, supra note 31, art. 18.
See, e.g., Yu Lingyun, Youzou Zai Guifan Yu Jianghua Zhijian: Dui
Jinhua Xingzheng Cailiang Jizhun Shijian de Sikao (游走在规范与僵化之間：
对金华行政裁量基准实践的思考),Wandering Between the Regulation and the
Ossification: Reflection on the Practice of Criteria for Administrative Discretion
in Jinhua, 3 QINGHUA FAXUE [TSINGHUA L. REV.] 54, 54-80 (2008); Zhang Yan,
et al., Shenzhen Shixing Zhi’an An Ziyou Cailiang (深圳试行治安案自由裁量)
[Shenzhen Tries the Discretionary Criteria in Public Security Cases]
SHENZHEN SHANGBAO [Shenzhen Economic Daily], July 16, 2004. Zhu
Mang, Riben Xingzheng Chengxu Fa Zhong de Cailiang Jizhun Zhidu (日本行政
程序法中的裁量基准制度) [Discretionary Criteria System in the Japanese
Administrative Procedure Law], 1 HUADONG ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. E.
CHINA U. POL. SCI. AND L.] 73, 73–79 (2006); Zhou Youyong, Cailiang Jizhun de
Zhengdangxing Wenti (裁量基准的正当性问题) [On the Legitimacy of the
Discretionary Criteria], 6 ZHONGGUO FAXUE [China Legal Sci.] 22, 22–32
(2007).
61
2010 Opinions, supra note 32, art. 16.
60
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discretion” thus far. Examples include rules promulgated by the
Construction Commission of Hangzhou City in 2010, by the
Housing and Urban-Rural Development Department of Zhejiang
Province in 2010, by the Education Bureau of Changsha City in
2010, and by the Bureau of Supervision and Administration of
Work Safety of Jiangsu Province in 2009.62
Discretionary criteria are, on one hand, useful for controlling
the exercise of broad administrative discretion within the scope of
rationality. On the other hand, they may be so detailed and concrete
that they “ossify” the exercise of discretion.63 However, given the
breadth of discretion that is granted to administrative agencies in
China, and the serious abuses that have resulted, the advantages of
administratively developed “criteria for discretion”—binding not
through legal obligation but on the basis of bureaucratic hierarchy—
outweigh the disadvantages.
D. Additional Examples
62

Zhejiangsheng Zhufang He Chengxiang Jiansheting Gongcheng
Jianshe Lingyu Xingzheng Chufa Cailiang Jizhun (Shixing) (浙江省住房和城乡
建设厅工程建设领域行政处罚裁量基准（试行）) [Zhejiang Housing and
Urban-Rural Development Department (Trial) Discretionary Criteria for
Administrative
Punishment
in
the
Area
of
Engineering
Construction ](promulgated by Zhejiang Housing and Urban-Rural Development
Department, Dec. 22, 2010, effective Jan. 1, 2011); Changshashi Jiaoyuju
Xingzheng Chufa Cailiangquan Jizhun (长沙市教育局行政处罚裁量权基
准)[Changsha Education Bureau Discretionary Criteria for Administrative
Punishment ] (promulgated by Changsha Education Bureau, effective Nov. 1,
2010); Hangzhoushi Gongcheng Jianshe Guanli Xingzheng Chufa Cailiang Guize
(杭州市工程建设管理行政处罚裁量规则)
[Hangzhou
Construction
Commission Rules on Discretion in Administrative Punishment for Engineering
Construction] (promulgated by Hangzhou Construction Commission, Oct. 15,
2010, revised June 16, 2011); Jiangsusheng Anquan Shengchan Xingzheng Chufa
Ziyou Cailiangquan Shiyong Guize (江苏省安全生产行政处罚自由裁量权使用
规则) [Jiangsu Bureau of Supervision and Administration of Work Safety Rules
for Discretion in Administrative Punishment in the Area of Work Safety]
(promulgated by Jiangsu Bureau of Supervision and Administration of Work
Safety, Aug. 31, 2009).
63
See Yu Lingyun, supra note 60 (discussing the discretionary criteria
for administrative discretion in Jinhua).
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The areas or issues covered by “administrative selfregulation” are certainly not limited just to the above-mentioned
examples of ex ante rule-making procedures, post hoc review of
promulgated rules, and criteria for the exercise of administrative
discretion. Chinese administration is also working to realize “the
rule of rules” by creating a large body of rules on aspects of major
decision-making procedures, disclosure of government information,
and administrative accountability, among other topics.64
The term “major decision-making” (zhongda juece) first
appeared in the State Council’s 2004 Outline, and subsequently was
included in the 2008 Decision and the 2010 Opinions. Pursuant to
these documents, by July 2014, the departments of the State Council
and governments at or above the county level issued at least 2,226
rules or documents stipulating major decision-making procedures, at
different levels of detail.65 Although the precise definition of
“major decision-making” is still not sufficiently clear and unified,
this national and local normative elaboration has actually, to some
extent, regularized the procedures for administrative decisions
which may have significant, large-scale impact. However, this term
has not yet appeared in any statute promulgated by the NPC and its
Standing Committee.
Neither has the disclosure of government information ever
been made a legal requirement by the NPC and its Standing
Committee. Since the enactment of the State Council’s Regulation
on Open Government Information (“OGI Regulation”) in 2007, the
General Office of the State Council has issued nine documents,
64
“The rule of rules” is actually an extension of “the rule of law,”
premised on the fact that public matters are mostly regulated under agency rules
rather than law enacted by the NPC. See Xixin Wang, Rule of Rules: An Inquiry
into Administrative Rules in China’s Rule of Law Context, in THE RULE OF LAW:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM, 71-89 (The Mansfield Center for Pacific
Affairs, 2000) (explaining “the rule of rules”).
65
Laws & Regulations Database of China Law Info,
http://chinalawinfo.com (accessed by searching the keyword zhongda xingzheng
juece [major decision-making]).
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departments of the State Council have issued 293 documents, and
governments at or above the county level have issued 2,205
documents, altogether meant to promote government openness by
providing more detailed interpretations, guidance, and procedural
requirements, as well as by publicizing relevant work reports.66
Although many of these additional rules elaborating the disclosure
of government information are essentially very similar to the OGI
Regulation, the sum total really does help to push forward gradual
and incremental changes.
Lastly, a new approach to top-down accountability was set in
motion by the eruption of SARS in 2003, which caused 349 death
all over the country, and eventually led to the dismissals of many
government officials, the highest being the Minister of Health,
Zhang Wenkang, and the mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong.67
Many provincial governors were shocked by these dismissals, and
for a time adjusted their focus from enhancing GDP to handling
SARS.68 The so-called “accountability storm” from this period is
widely accepted as the basis for strengthening top-down
accountability more systematically. Since that time, the CCP
Central Committee and the State Council have separately or jointly
issued a series of rules designed to heighten accountability for Party
and government leaders at different levels. The most significant and
regularized mechanisms are provided in the Interim Provisions on
Accountability for Party and Government Leaders (Guanyu Shixing
Dangzheng Lingdao Ganbu Wenze de Zanxing Guiding) that was
66
This data is obtained from the Laws & Regulations Database of China
Law Info, http://www/chinalawinfo.com (accessed by searching the keyword
zhengfu xinxi gongkai [open government information]).
67
See Zhang Hui, “Feidian” Shinian: Shenghuo Jiu Zheyang Gaibian (“
非典”十年：生活就这样改变) [ The Decade of SARS: Life Has Changed],
MINZHU YU FAZHI SHIBAO [THE DEMOCRACY AND LAW TIMES], Apr.
8, 2013.
68
See Shou Beibei, Wenze Yinian: “Xiake” Guanyuan Jin Anzai? (问责
一年：“下课”官员今安在?)
[After One Year: Where Are the Dismissed Officials?], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S.
WEEKEND], July 8, 2004 (discussing what happened after the dismissals).
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issued by the General Offices of the CCP Central Committee and
the State Council in 2009. Subsequently, there have been at least
twenty-two implementing rules issued by local party offices and
governments.69 This top-down internal instrument is to make the
administrative leaders at different levels accountable for important
decisions and serious incidents or accidents which arouse wide
concern. The fact that it is mostly not based on democracy but
rather on bureaucracy may discount the expected effect of this kind
of accountability to improve the competence as well as the reliance
of public administration. However, it really places more burden
than before on the shoulders of the administrative leaders to be
responsive to the public needs or concerns.
III. Dynamics
The insufficiency of external regulation is, of course, one of
the reasons for the rise of “administrative self-regulation.” The key
question is why the administrative regime has the motivation to
consider self-constraint notwithstanding the loopholes of external
regulation, rather than “gallop in the broad land” granted by the
legislators? Also, to what extent is administrative self-regulation, as
a driver for the advancement of the rule of administrative law,
worthy of belief and reliance? Arguably, it is the following
dynamics that are in favor of such administrative self-regulation.
A. Demand for Rational-Legal Authority
It appears that the “New China”—from the leadership of Mao
Zedong, to Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and now Xi
Jingping—has experienced the progressive decline of Weberian

69

“Laws & Regulations Database” of China Law Info,
http://www.chinalawinfo.com (accessed by searching the keyword dangzheng
lingdao ganbu wenze [accountability for the leaders of the Party and
Government]).
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charismatic authority.70 In the process of leading China to
transform from an agricultural society to an industrial society, and
overseeing migration from rural areas to cities, it has proven
impossible for Chinese rulers, facing the continuing task of
modernization, to withdraw to traditional forms of authority.71
Rational-legal authority seems to be the sole option for China’s
rulers, provided the aims remain fixed to economic growth, political
stability, social justice, and long-term acceptance by the Chinese
people. Basically, this has become the consensus of China’s
leadership since Deng Xiaoping’s tenure. In December of 1978,
Deng Xiaoping said:
It is necessary to strengthen the legal system in order to
guarantee the people’s democracy. It is necessary to
institutionalize democracy and concretize it into laws.
The institutions and laws thus created are not to be
changed just due to the change of leaders, are not to be
changed just due to the change of viewpoints and
attention of leaders.72
Ye Jianying, another very important and influential leader
during the time of Deng Xiaoping, also declared that a country must
70
See JOANNA WALEY-COHEN, THE SEXTANTS OF BEIJING: GLOBAL
CURRENTS IN CHINESE HISTORY 279 (1999) (noting that many government
leaders of the 1990s lacked the prestige of Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping). See
also Li Lin, Deng Xiaoping Yu Dangdai Zhongguo Zhengzhi Quanwei de
Lixinghua (邓小平与当代中国政治权威的理性化) [Deng Xiaoping and the
Rationalization of Current Political Authority in China], 2 ZHONGGONG QINGDAO
SHIWEI DANGXIAO, QINGDAO XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. OF THE PARTY
SCH. OF CPC QINGDAO MUN. COMMITTEE (QINGDAO ADMIN. C.)] 15, 15–18
(2006) (describing the type of leadership of Deng Xiaoping).
71
Weberian traditional forms of authority are arguably more easily
rooted in societies consisting of a small-peasant economy, totalitarian politics,
and closed culture. Ren Jiantao, Daode Yu Zhongguo Chuantong Zhengzhi de
Hefaxing (道德与中国传统政治的合法性) [Morality and the Legitimacy of
Traditional Politics of China], 1 HUAZHONG SHIFAN DAXUE XUEBAO (RENWEN
SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [J. OF HUAZHONG NORMAL U. (HUMANITIES AND SOC. SCI.)]
27, 27–34 (2005).
72
DENG XIAOPING (邓小平), DENG XIAOPING WENXUAN (邓小平文选)
[SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING]146 (1994).
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be ruled by laws and institutions that have stability, continuity, and
foremost authority; he said it is only through legal procedures that
laws and institutions are to be revised—they should not be changed
due to the change in will of any particular leader.73 Since the end of
the Cultural Revolution, the demand for rational-legal authority has
been continuing and even increasing.74 Given that background, and
where the legislature or judiciary lacks capacity to control the
administration, there is reason for the administrative regime itself to
pursue a type of “self-regulation,” aiming thereby to realize an
“administration by rules.” The mostly hierarchical administration
would operate more on the rules rather than on the arbitrary and
unaccountable wills of the leaders, which are deemed as one of the
evil sources of huge disorders such as the Cultural Revolution.
B. Soil for Ideologies of Democracy and the Rule of Law
China currently remains in transition from an agricultural
society to a more urban one. In 2010, the population of rural areas
remains 720 million.
(This number does not include the
approximately 170–180 million people who are still classified as
farmers in terms of the residence registration (hukou) system, but
who have left the countryside and lived for more than six months in

73

Liu Zheng, Xinshiqi de Renda Gongzuo Cong Zheli Qibu: Wujie
Quanguo Renda Erci Huiyi de Gongji (新时期的人大工作从这里起步——五届
全国人大二次会议的功绩) [The Work of the People’s Congress In the New Era
Starts From Here: Achievements of the Second Session of the Fifth National
People’s Congress], 12 ZHONGGUO RENDA [CHINESE PEOPLE’S CONGRESS] 40,
40–41 (2002).
74
When emphasizing the importance of stability and continuity of laws
and systems, Ye Jianying observed that the cost of this lesson was paid with the
blood drawn by Lin Biao and the “Gang of Four.” Id. at 40. It reflects a starting
point for the Chinese demand for rational-legal authority in the aftermath of the
Cultural Revolution. Wang Xiaoming & Huang Weiping, Lun Xinshiji Zhongguo
Gongchandang de Zhizheng Jichu (论新世纪中国共产党的执政基础) [On the
Legitimate Basis of the Chinese Communist Party’s Ruling Position in the New
Century] 5 SHENZHEN DAXUE XUEBAO [J. OF SHENZHEN U.] 13, 21–22 (2001).
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cities or towns).75 The transition in question is and will be from a
situation of rural areas suffering negative effects from cities to the
unified development of urban-rural areas; from a society based on
acquaintances (shuren shehui)76 to a society of strangers; and from
fragmented and diverse rural lifestyles to a relatively uniform urban
lifestyle. Amidst this transition, there is ever greater economic and
social “soil” for the ideologies of democracy and the rule of law to
take root.
Indeed, democracy and the rule of law have been recognized
by the Chinese leadership as among the ruling ideologies. This is
illustrated by the addition of this sentence: “[t]he People's Republic
of China governs the country according to law and makes it a
socialist country under rule of law” into the PRC Constitution in
1999,77 and also by the State Council’s subsequent issuance of the
1999 Decision, the 2004 Outline and the 2010 Opinions. With
further change in economic and social conditions, there certainly
will be a greater number of people supportive of these ideologies
and aware of the significance of democracy and the rule of law for
75

Xing Shiwei, Zhongguo Nongcun Renkou 30 Nianhou Jiang Jianzhi 4
Yi (中国农村人囗30年后将减至4亿) [The Population of Rural Areas Will Be
Decreased to 400 Million 30 Years After], XINGJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], (Feb.
24, 2010).
76
The concept of “shuren shehui” was proposed by a well-known
sociologist Fei Xiaotong, which is regarded as a classical description of the
characteristics of Chinese traditional rural society. People in shuren shehui not
only know each other but also have mutual trust and subconscious compliance
with behavioral customs due to their long life together and intimate relationships.
FEI XIONGTONG (费孝通), EARTH-BOUND CHINA REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM, 9–10,
44, (Beijing: Peking University Press, 1998); Chen Baifeng, Shuren Shehui:
Cunzhuang Zhixu Jizhi de Lixiangxing Tanjiu (熟人社会：村庄秩序机制的理
想型探究熟人社會：村莊秩序機制的理想型探究) [On the Acquaintance
Community: An Ideal-Type Exploration of the Mechanism in the Village Order], 1
SHEHUI [CHINESE J. OF SOC.] 223, 224–26 (2011).
77
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (1999 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共
和国宪法(1999修正)) [Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1999
Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 1999，
effective Mar. 15, 1999), art. 5, § 1 (1999); see also art. 13 (amending Article 5 to
include “The People's Republic of China governs the country according to law
and makes it a socialist country under rule of law”).
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the protection of their rights and interests.78 Facing such growing
demands from the public, the administrative regime may be
compelled to adopt more self-regulation in response.
C. Pressure of Democratic Legitimacy
Like many other countries, the legitimacy of public
administration in China is also proclaimed to be founded on the
basis of democracy. In principle, the State Council is the executive
arm of the NPC and its Standing Committee, while the local
governments at various levels are the executive arms of the local
congresses and their standing committees.79 However, the problem
of a “loose transmission-belt”80 typical in Western countries is even
more serious in China, because of which the public administration

78

For example, a questionnaire survey demonstrates that, compared
with the low-income people, the higher-income people are more concerned with
the constitutional protection of private property. Almost 99% of the surveyed
private sector owners hold with the opinion that the legitimate private property
should get equal protection with the public property, and 81.3% of the people who
show indifference to the constitutional article on the private property protection
are at the low-income level. Sun Changjun & Zhang Huihua, Siyou Caichan
Baohu de Shehui Xinli Diaocha ji Xiangguan Yanjiu (私有财产保护的社会心理
调查及相关研究) [The Research and the Countermeasure about the Public
Psychology in Protecting Private Property], 2 HENAN SIFA JINGGUAN ZHIYE
XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. HENAN JUD. POLICE VOCATIONAL C.] 99, 101 (2005).
79
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (1982 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共
和国宪法(1982修正)) [Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1982
Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People's Cong., Dec. 4, 1999), art. 85,
105 (Article 85: “The State Council, that is, the Central People's Government, of
the People's Republic of China is the executive body of the highest organ of state
power; it is the highest organ of state administration;” Article 105: “Local
people's governments at various levels are the executive bodies of local organs of
state power as well as the local organs of state administration at the corresponding
levels. Governors, mayors and heads of counties, districts, townships and towns
assume overall responsibility for local people's governments at various different
levels”).
80
See Stewart, supra note 13 (discussing the loose legislative control of
administrative discretion).
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seems to lack a solid foundation of its legitimacy.81 Furthermore,
representative democracy, although having undergone large changes
in the past thirty years, still remains weak and subordinate to the
dominance of the administration. The administrative regime has a
very powerful and influential position in the structure of
government.
However, at the same time, the administrative regime is also
increasingly propelled by public opinion and forced to be more
directly accountable to the people, while ideologies of democracy
and the rule of law are slowly but irreversibly expanding. 82 The
growth of internet technology can help to shape public opinion
81

For example, most of the tax legislation in the past was not enacted by
the National People’s Congress, but by the State Council. Recently it has
incurred more and more criticism from some deputies of the NPC as well as many
scholars. Hence the Law on Legislation was amended in 2015 by stating that “the
establishment of any category of tax, determination of tax rates, tax collection
administration, and other basic taxation rules” are the matters that shall only be
governed by law except for the cases where laws have not yet been developed on
the matters and the NPC or its Standing Committee delegate the legislating power
to the State Council. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (2015 Xiuzheng) (中
华人民共和国立法法(2015修正)) [The Law on Legislation of the People’s
Republic of China (2015 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective Jul. 1, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 2015), art. 8(6).
Furthermore, Ms. Fu Ying, the spokeswoman of the third plenary of the 12 NPC
in 2015, released that it will be no later than the year of 2020 that the
establishment of any new tax shall only be vested in the NPC or its Standing
Committee. Yinhong & Wang Haokui, 2020 Nianqian Quanmian Luoshi
Shuishou Fading Yuanze (2020年前全面落实税收法定原则) [The Principle of
Statutory Taxation Will Be Fully Implemented Before the Year of 2020],
GUANGMING RIBAO [GUANGMING DAILY], Mar. 5, 2015.
82
The development of an administrative accountability system since
2003, notwithstanding its limitations, is generally regarded as an attempt to
realize some form of democracy in the current political context of China. See,
e.g., Lin Congjian & Zhou Yayue, Woguo Wanshan Xingzheng Wenze Zhizhi
Lujing Fenxi (我国完善行政问责制止路径分析) [Analysis of the Path to
Improve the Administrative Accountability in China], 3 NINGBO DAXUE XUEBAO
(RENWEN KEXUE BAN) [J. NINGBO U. (LIBERAL ARTS)] 105, 105–11 (2006); Cao
Liu, Cong Wenzhou Dongche Shigu Chuli Kan Woguo Xingzheng Wenzezhi de
Fazhan (从温州动车事故处理看我国行政问责制的发展) [On the Development
of China’s Administrative Accountability System By Observing the Treatment of
Wenzhou Bullet Train Accident], 1 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU [ADMIN. L. REV.]
112, 112–17 (2012).
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extremely rapidly, and voices criticizing the administration for
breach of democracy or the rule of law can immediately pose huge
pressures on both lower-level and superior officials.83 Both
potential and actual pressure from the public has been forcing the
administrative regime, particularly the State Council at the very top,
to seek to bind administrators (both leaders and lower-level
personnel) by self-regulation in order to decrease or eliminate their
misconduct, corruption or other abuses of power, and further to
strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the administrative regime.
D. Structure of Bureaucracy
Another important factor driving administrative selfregulation is the bureaucratic structure of the administrative regime.
One of the defining characteristics of such a hierarchical structure is
that the superior commands the subordinate.84 And yet, in practice,
83

Hu Xue, Cong Wangluo Kongjuzheng Kan Wangluo Wenze dui
Guanyuan de Yinxing Yingxiang (从网络恐惧症看网络问责对官员的隐性影响)
[On the Invisible Influence of Administrative Accountability through Internet on
the Officials by Observing the Cyberphobia], 5 LILUN GUANCHA [THEORETICAL
OBSERVATION] 61, 61–62 (2009); Zhou Yayue & Han Zhiming, Gongmin
Wangluo Wenze: Xingdong Luoji Yu Yaosu Fenxi (公民网络问责：行动逻辑与
要素分析) [Administrative Accountability through the Internet: An Analysis of the
Logics of the Public Action and the Elements], 5 BEIJING HANGKONG HANGTIAN
DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [J. OF BEIJING U. OF AERONAUTICS AND
ASTRONAUTICS (SOC. SCI.)] 1, 1–5 (2011); Luo Yong, Wangluo Shidai Xia de
Wangluo Wenze: Yizhong Xinxing Minzhu Xingtai de Kaoliang (网络時代下的网
络问责：一种新兴民主形态的考量) [Administrative Accountability through the
Internet in the Internet Era: Examining a New Form of Democracy], 4 YUNNAN
XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. YUNNAN ADMIN. C.] 64, 64–66 (2009).
84
MAX WEBER, JINGJI YU SHEHUI (经济与社会) [ECON. & SOC’Y] 246
(Lin Rongyuan trans., Shangwu Yinshuguan (商务印书馆) [Commercial Press]
1997) (1922); Ma Jianyin, Xiandai Fazhi Guanliao Zhiyu “Lixing Tielong”: Cong
Weibo de Shehui Lilun Zhifa Chufa (现代法治官僚之余“理性铁笼”: 从微博
的社会理论执法处罚) [Modern Rule of Law, Bureaucracy and “Iron Cage of
Rationality”: Starting from the Law Enforcement and Punishment under the
Social Theory of Weber], 2 QINGHUA FAXUE [TSINGHUA L. REV.] 33, 41–42
(2008); Huang Xiaoyong, Weibo Lixing Guanliaozhi Fanchou de Zairenshi (微博
理性官僚之范畴的再认识) [Rethinking of Weber’s Theory of Rational
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the leadership at various levels of the government in China fear the
severe public criticism that might arise from serious problems or
scandals.85 Given this concern, administrative self-regulation has a
two-fold function: (i) to restrict arbitrariness by administrative
subordinates, and (ii) to share with or transfer accountability to
these subordinates. Besides, the engineering of advancing the
administration by law, which is mostly initiated by the State
Bureaucracy], 2 QINGHUA DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [J.
TSINGHUA U. (PHIL. & SOC. SCI.)] 50, 51–52 (2002).
85
Such fear is reflected by the development of administrative
accountability at the urging of the central government. See Guanyu Shixing
Dangzheng Lingdao Ganbu Wenze de Zanxing Guiding (关于实行党政领导干部
问责的暂行规定) [Interim Provisions on the Implementation of the
Accountability System for the Leaders of the Party and Government] (issued by
the Gen. Office of the Cent. Comm. of the Chinese Communist Party and the Gen.
Office of the St. Council, Jun. 30, 2009, effective Jun. 30, 2009), art. 5 (2009):
Under any of the following circumstances, a leader of the Party
and government shall be held accountable:
1. He/she makes serious faulty decisions, which leads to severe
losses or adverse effects;
2. He/she neglects his/her duties, which leads to the occurrence of
an extremely serious accident, incident, or case, or successive
occurrences of serious accidents, incidents, or cases in the region,
department, system or entity where he/she worked during a
relatively short period, causing severe losses or adverse effects;
3. A functional department of a government has a poor
administration and supervision, which leads to the occurrence of an
extremely serious accident, incident, or case, or successive
occurrences of serious accidents, incidents, or cases within the
scope of its duties during a relatively short period, causing severe
losses or adverse effects;
4. He/she abuses power in administrative activities, forces or
instructs others to conduct illegal administrative activities or has a
nonfeasance, which causes a mass incident or other serious
incidents;
5. He/she improperly handles a mass or emergent incident, which
worsens the situation and causes adverse effects;
6. He/she violates the relevant provisions on selecting and
appointing cadres, which leads to the evaluation failure or faulty
use of personnel, causing adverse effects; or
7. He/she conducts other neglect of duties, causing severe losses of
national interests, human life and property, and public property, or
causing adverse effects, etc.
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Council, could be used by administrative superiors to better control
their subordinates.
IV. Conclusion
Due to the above dynamics, administrative self-regulation
seems to be playing a positive role in advancing the rule of
administrative law in China. However, it is only one of the forces
that might push forward the process, and it has its own inherent and
formidable limitations. Indeed, the dynamics of administrative selfregulation are limited in terms of both steadiness and effectiveness.
First, the State Council, the most important driver of
administrative self-regulation, does not have sufficient time and
resources to supervise the practical performance of self-regulation
by the innumerable subordinate administrative agencies across the
country. Likewise, the “transmission belts” between the State
Council, provincial governments, municipal governments, county
governments and the town governments are loose. It is still unclear
whether the self-regulation provisions promulgated by local
governments and their departments will nominally cater to the
demands of superiors, or will actually be carried out and put into
effect.
Second, the pressure of public opinion that to some extent
drives and supervises administrative self-regulation is mostly
formed and represented through the media. The space in which the
media has to operate may be limited, and some illegal actions or
decisions by the central or local governments may not be allowed to
receive full reports and disclosure. Separately, news reports may
rapidly give rise to certain public opinion, but also may just as
rapidly transfer attention to other subjects or topics, making it
difficult to keep continuous pressure on the governments or their
departments. The pressure of public opinion is limited if it is very
hard to transform it into systematic, steady and effective checks and
balances by legislative or judicial bodies. Hence, the contribution
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of administrative self-regulation to the rule of administrative law in
China must be observed, analyzed and recognized systematically
and carefully. Expectations might be placed on administrative selfregulation for its contribution to the rule of administrative law in
China; however, it is highly unlikely that the rule of administrative
law can be achieved solely through administrative self-regulation.
External regulation and its effectiveness are not only indispensable,
but more important. Otherwise, the final results of one-sided
development of administrative self-regulation would be ubiquitous
glass ceilings.
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